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I. INTRODUCTION

Adoption is "[t]he creation of a parent-child relationship by judicial
order between two parties [who may be] unrelated."' It is a process
"whereby a person takes another person into the relations of child and
thereby acquires the rights and incurs the responsibilities of parent in
respect of such other person." 2 Adoptions were not recognized at common
law; therefore, who may adopt a child is determined by state statutes that
vary widely. 3 The state's interest lies in securing a permanent, stable
placement for children and in protecting the integrity of the adoption
process. 4
Adoption is not a right for the child or the prospective adoptive parents.
It is a privilege that is bestowed upon some qualified adults. In the
adoption process, the best interests of the child are paramount. 5 When a
woman and her brother file a petition to adopt her biological child after the
woman divorces the child's biological father, whether the brother and sister
may jointly adopt this child is governed by the adoption statute that exists
in their state of residence.
All states allow qualified single adults and married couples to adopt a
child if the married couples adopt jointly. Only a few courts have decided
whether unmarried persons may adopt a child jointly. Such a limitation in
the laws has a profound significance for not only the number of qualified
adults who are able to adopt but also for the number of children who are
adopted each year. If more states permitted persons who were not only
unmarried, but those who had a close, committed bond, beyond just
romantic or sexual to adopt, the numbers for both eligible adoptive parents
and adopted children would increase. Part II of this article explains who
may adopt under current statutes.6 Part III describes children who are
available for adoption and provides statistics about such children, and Part
IV describes the groups of persons who actually adopt children under
current statutory law. 7 Part V discusses case law in which courts have
addressed the question of whether two particular prospective adoptive
parents who are unmarried but may or may not be romantically linked to
each other may adopt a child.8 Part VI proposes a new definition for joint
1. A HANDBOOK OF FAMILY LAW TERMS 23 (Bryon A. Garner ed., 2001).
2. In re Adoption of Carl, 709 N.Y.S.2d 905, 907 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 2000).

3. Id. at 907-08.
4. Id. at 909.

5. See id. (holding that the proposed adoption was in the child's best interests,
which is the determinative factor in deciding whether to grant an adoption petition).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Parts III-IV.
8. See infra Part V.
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adoption, an expanded interpretation of adoption statutes, and legislative
amendments to increase the number of people who are eligible to adopt in
order to reflect the modem, realistic composition of families. 9 The
proposal also offers criteria for evaluating joint petitions and explores the
benefits for both the children who need permanent homes and the adults
who wish to be their parents. Although adults may petition to adopt adults,
this article focuses only on a different approach for who may adopt
children because more than 100,000 children are available for adoption.
II. WHO MAY ADOPT A CHILD UNDER CURRENT STATUTES
In all states, statutes provide that the following persons may adopt a
child: single persons, a husband and wife together, and stepparents.] 0 In
addition, a few state courts also allow unmarried cohabitants to adopt a
child.1" Presently, a very small group of unmarried adults are allowed to
adopt jointly by express statutory promulgation. 2 A few statutes expressly
exclude certain groups of people from adopting any children.13 Section
63.042(3) of the Florida statute, for example, provides that same-sex
persons whether single
or in a committed relationship, may not adopt
14
state.
that
in
children

III. WHO Is AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION
Approximately 114,000 children are available for adoption annually
from the child welfare system. 15 At fifty-three percent, male children
slightly outnumber the female children who are available.' 6 Their ages

9. See infra Part VI.
10. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.020 (2009); ARIz. REv. STAT. § 8-103
(LexisNexis 2008); D.C. CODE § 16-302 (2009); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110
(McKinney 2009).
11. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993).
12. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2009); see also CYNTHIA R. MABRY &
LISA KELLY, ADOPTION LAW: THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 126 (2006) (reporting
that in states where unmarried adults are not permitted to adopt jointly, legislatures
have reasoned that unmarried adults would be unable to provide the family stability or
permanence that a child needs).
13. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (2008) (prohibiting same gender adoptions);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78(B)-6-117(3) (West 2008) (excluding sexually involved
unmarried cohabitants).
14. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (LexisNexis 2008) (prohibiting all same-sex
adoptions).
15. ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE ANALYSIS AND REPORTING SYSTEM, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PRELIMINARY FY 2005 ESTIMATES AS OF SEPTEMBER

2006

5,

http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats-research/afcars/tar/reportl3.pdf

[hereinafter ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE].

16. Id.
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range from under one-year-old to seventeen-years-old.1 7 They represent all
races, but the largest groups are White (45,096), African American
(40,840), and Latino (17,240). 18 Only 51,000 of the available children are
adopted each year from the child welfare system.19 Many of them, over
20,000 per year, will age out of the system because they will not be
adopted before they reach the age of majority. 20
Many of the children who are available for adoption are classified as
special needs children. 2' They are children who are older than eight or
nine. They are children of color. They are children with physical or
mental disabilities or some other medical condition that requires
extraordinary care.
IV. WHO ACTUALLY ADOPTS AVAILABLE CHILDREN
The previous section describes the children who are eligible for adoption
in the United States. This section addresses who actually takes advantage
of the opportunity to adopt some of the 114,000 children who are waiting
to be adopted in any given year. In its most recent report, the United States
Department of Health and Human Services' Administration for Children
and Families reported that 51,000 children were adopted in 2007.22
Married couples adopted sixty-eight percent or 34,898 children.
Single
females adopted twenty-seven percent or 13,822 children, while single
males adopted three percent or 1,483 children.24 Unmarried couples
adopted two percent or 797 children.2 5
Also, relatives and foster parents adopt many children. During the
period between October 1, 2005 and September 30, 2006 more than forty
percent of the adoptions that were finalized in Alaska (46%), California
(46%), Hawaii (55%), Michigan (42%), and Oklahoma (44%) were relative
adoptions.2 6 During the same period, foster parents adopted more than fifty
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id
21. See 26 U.S.C. § 23(d)(3) (2006) (defining special needs children); see also
MABRY & KELLY, supra note 12, at 241 (citing other statutes which define special
needs children).
22. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVS., TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION FY 2002-FY 2007 1 (2008),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/ statsresearch/afcars/trends.htm.
23. ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE, supranote 15, at 8.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PRIOR RELATIONSHIP OF ADOPTIVE PARENT(S) TO CHILD OCTOBER 1, 2005 TO

SEPTEMBER 30, 2006 1 (2006), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/statsresearch
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percent of children who were adopted in forty states including the District
of Columbia (90%), Illinois (99.9%), Massachusetts (99.3%), and Virginia
(90%).27 Other states, like Indiana (54%) and Minnesota (61.6%), reported
a significant percentage of adoptions by adults who were unrelated to the
children whom they adopted.28 Many more adults have expressed an
interest in adopting children, but barriers such as prohibitions on same-sex
adoptions and joint adoptions prevent them from adopting a child.29
Single women adopt thousands of children. These applicants' income,
education levels, and occupations vary. They tend to have "a positive selfimage and to have high expectations of themselves." 30 They also have "a
high capacity for nurturing a child.., and a high degree of sensitivity to
the needs of children." 3 1 Some of these single mothers are dependent upon
32
their parents to help them with parenting the children whom they adopt.
Yet they face social stigma that may prevent more single women from
adopting children. Single women who choose to adopt a child without a
nuclear family are viewed as selfish because they are not providing a father
and an intact home for a child.33 Some opponents contend that single
parenting leads to social problems.34
Some agencies and birth mothers do not accept applications from single
adults. Others will accept a single person's application but favor a married
couple when a child is eligible for placement.3 5 Though single parent
/afcars/statistics/priorrel tbl62006.htm.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See JEFF KATZ, & EVAN B. DONALDSON,

ADOPTION INST., LISTENING TO
PARENTS: OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN FROM FOSTER CARE

28 (2005) (quoting one woman who describes the potential adoptive parent orientation
as welcoming to all, except same-sex applicants).

30. See Joan F. Shireman & Penny R. Johnson, Single Persons as Adoptive

Parents, 50 SOC. SERV. REV. 103, 106-07 (1976) (indicating that single women who
adopted children seemed to possess good coping skills to deal with problems and life's
stresses).
31. Id. at 107-08.

32. Id. at 113.
33. See Martha Osborne, Single Parent Adoption and Women, http://adoption.

about.com/od/nontraditional/a/singleapar.htm (last visited June 4, 2009) (describing
how, unlike married adoptive couples, single mothers are not so readily lauded for their
desire to pursue adoption).
34. Id.; See LAURA BEAUvAIs-GODWIN & RAYMOND GODWIN, THE COMPLETE
ADOPTION BOOK: EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW TO ADOPT A CHILD 129 (2d ed.
2000) (stating that statistically, single-parent families produce children with more
social problems, but that these statistics are based on poor, undereducated teenage
moMs); MADY PROWLER, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SINGLE PARENT
ADOPTION: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 4 (1994),
http://www.harmony.
cc/uploads/pdf/Single%20Parent%20Adoption.pdf .
35. See PROWLER, supra note 34, at 4 (describing how some agencies will put
applications from single applicants on the back burner while waiting to find a couple
who wants to adopt).
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adoption is gaining acceptance, many still espouse the traditional view
"that a child needs a mother and a father for healthy growth and
development," citing mental health experts who believe "that the 'ideal' is
home with a mother and father who are
to place a child in a two-parent
36
compatible and loving."
Single women and unmarried same-sex persons are more likely to adopt
special needs children. Some of them adopt special needs children because
they are more willing to parent children who need extra care, and birth
mothers favor married couples for healthy infants.3 7 The Child Welfare
League of America favors a more inclusive recognition of applicants that
should be endorsed by others: "All applicants should have an equal
opportunity to apply for the adoption of children, and should receive fair
and equal treatment and consideration of their qualifications as adoptive
parents, consistent with state and federal laws." 8
V. CURRENT AUTHORITY RECOGNIZING JOINT ADOPTION

A few courts have addressed the issue of whether unmarried couples
may adopt a child jointly. 39 Two questions arise when joint petitions are
filed. The first question is whether the relevant adoption statute permits
joint adoption.4 ° If so, the second question becomes whether the proposed
joint adoption would be in the child's best interests.
To answer the first question, courts first analyze the plain language of
the applicable adoption statute. Then, if they find that the language does
not expressly provide for such adoptions, as is common in most of the
statutes, the courts peruse the legislative history of the statutes to ascertain
what the legislators intended when they wrote the statutory language.
Finding no direction in the legislative history, courts have interpreted the
language applying principles of either liberal construction or strict statutory
construction.
36. See id.(discussing obstacles to single parent adoption, including tougher
scrutiny).
37. See Cynthia R. Mabry, Opening Another Exit from Child Welfare For Special
Needs Children: Why Some Gay Men andLesbians Should Have the Privilegeto Adopt
Children in Florida, 18 ST.THOMAS L. REv. 269, 286 (2005) (providing results from a

study of gays and lesbians that shows that ninety-five percent of 183 subjects adopted
children who would be considered special needs).

38. See CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE FOR
ADOPTION SERVICES 56 (2000) (citing relevant considerations, including an applicant's
ability to successfully parent a child and an individual assessment of an applicant's
capacity to understand and meet the needs of a particular available child).
39. See, e.g., S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 822 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (holding
that a stepparent-like adoption cannot exist in harmony with Kentucky law).
40. See id.at 826 (criticizing the lower court for "blatantly disregard[ing]
universal rules of statutory construction" when it held that adoption statutes should not
be read literally in order to allow the adoption at issue).
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A. The LiberalistInterpretation- GrantingJoint Petitions

Several states including the District of Columbia, California, Indiana,
Massachusetts, and Vermont have granted joint petitions to adopt that were
submitted by heterosexual or same-sex couples who were not married.4'
The analysis in cases interpretting those states' statutes is persuasive and
instructive as we consider whether unmarried adults who are not involved
in an intimate relationship should be permitted to adopt a child together.42
Second parent adoption, also called co-parent adoption, involves
"adoption of a child by her parent's non-marital partner, without requiring
the first parent to give up any rights or responsibilities to the child. ' A 3 It is
distinguished from the concept ofjoint and shared parenting because not all
prospective adoptive parents want to adopt a child who is the biological or
adoptive child of a partner.
Both heterosexual and same-sex unmarried couples who are living
together and committed to each other have been allowed to adopt children
under a liberal construction of unclear or ambiguous statutes. All of the
courts emphasize the primary goal and purpose of adoption-to create a
new family for a child who needs a permanent home.44 In analyzing the
statutory language, these courts concluded that the adoption statute neither
authorized nor prohibited two unmarried persons to adopt. The courts
concluded that the phrases "any person" or "any adult" may adopt could be

41. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000 (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a724(a)(3) (West 2008); D.C. CODE § 16-302 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1102(b) (2009).
42. See Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73 P.3d 554, 558 (Cal. 2003) (reversing the lower
court's grant to allow a birth mother to withdraw her consent to, and to terminate, the
adoption by her former domestic partner); In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that the Act must be construed to give standing to the
unmarried persons in these cases, regardless of sex or sexual orientation, to petition for
adoption jointly). See generally In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995);
In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind.Ct. App. 2004); Adoption of Tammy,
619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d
535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re
Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002); In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B.
and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
43. See Elizabeth Zuckerman, Comment, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-

Parented Families: Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
729, 731 n.8 (1986). But see Adoptions of T.K.J. and K.A.K., 931 P.2d 488, 490-91,
496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that a "co-parent" adoption, in effect, grants the
petitioner the rights and duties associated with "stepparent adoption"); S.J.L.S., 265
S.W.3d at 815-16, 822-23 (denying a petition for a "step-parent like adoption" by a
domestic partner); In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Neb. 2002); In re
Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1994).
44. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2007) (recognizing that past jurisprudence was "predicated on the rationale that the
relationship between the proposed adoptive parents is the functional equivalent of the
traditional husband-wife relationship, albeit between same-sex couples or unmarried
partners").
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read in the plural form.4 5
In In re MMD.& B.H.M,4 6 a seminal case on this issue, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals decided whether a same-sex couple that was
living together in a "committed personal relationship" was eligible to adopt
a child under the District of Columbia adoption statute.4 7 If so, the court
would also consider whether the couple could adopt the child jointly.48
Section 16-302 of the District of Columbia Code provides that while any
person may petition for a decree of adoption, the court will not consider the
petition unless the petitioner's spouse, if he or she has one, also joins in the
petition, "except that if either the husband or wife is a natural parent of the
prospective adoptee, the natural parent need not join in the petition with the
adopting parent, but need only give his or her consent to the adoption. ''49
Initially, the court applied the general principle that "if a statute does not
contain "a limiting adverb such as 'solely,' [it would not] imply such a
50
restriction.,
The legislative history of the statute was not instructive regarding
whether joint petitions were permitted. The statute and the legislative
history were silent as to whether unmarried couples could adopt a child in
the District of Columbia. 5' However, the legislative history did reveal a
policy of inclusiveness. Therefore, the court concluded that based on
District of Columbia adoption policies, liberal interpretations should be
applied to the unclear and ambiguous adoption statute.52
The Court of Appeals rejected strict construction that courts in other
jurisdictions had applied to other state adoption statutes. The Court of
Appeals found that, "strict construction would deny adoptions to unmarried
couples simply because adoption as such was impossible at common law
and, solely for that reason, should be precluded unless the statute expressly

45. See In re MM.D. & B.H.M, 662 A.2d at 846 (ruling that one of the main issues
of the case was not whether more than one person may adopt a child, but rather
whether in all instances when two persons seek to adopt they must be married to each

other).

46. Id. at 840.
47. Id.
48. See id. (stating that if the court determined that a same-sex couple was living in
a committed personal relationship, the next issue would be to determine whether the
fact that one member of the couple already has adopted the child creates any
impediment to both joining in the adoption).
49. D.C. CODE § 16-302 (2009).
50. In re Adoption of M.A., 930 A.2d 1088, 1093 (Me. 2007).
51. See In re MMD. & B.H.M, 662 A.2d at 854 (concluding that "the strict
construction approach, like the expression unius maxim, does not offer a persuasive
reason for precluding adoption by unmarried couples").
52. See id. at 844-46 (reiterating four general rules for liberal statutory

interpretation).
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recognizes a particular adoptive relationship. 5 3 Not persuaded by other
courts' opinions, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided that a
mechanical application of strict construction principles was not a
persuasive
basis for precluding unmarried couples from adopting
54
children.
Next, the court considered the policy that underlies the adoption process,
which is "to provide a loving, nurturing home that pursues the best interests
of the adopted child." 55 The court then considered a myriad of benefits that
56
the adoptee and the adoptive parents would receive upon adoption.
Finally, it concluded that it was "satisfied that the paramount statutory
purpose-the 'best interests' of the adoptee-will be best served, and that
no other affected interests protected by the statute will be ill served, by a
liberal, inclusive interpretation" of the statute by ruling that "unmarried
couples, whether same-sex or opposite-sex, who are living together in a
committed personal relationship, are eligible to file petitions for adoption
under [section 16-305]." 57 The court decided that the legislature did not
intend to impose a restriction to bar petitions to adopt from unmarried
persons.58 Accordingly, in the District of Columbia, unmarried couples
would be included in the group of persons who may adopt jointly.59
Many of the cases in which courts have granted joint petitions for
unmarried couples to adopt were decided in New York. In re Adoption of
Joseph involved an unmarried heterosexual couple's petition to adopt their
foster child. 60 They were cohabitants who had parented the child together
for three years. 6' The couple had successfully maintained a relationship
together for twenty-nine years.62 The court opined that the issue of a joint
petition was a question for the legislature, but nonetheless granted the
53. See id. at 853 (recognizing "an overriding need to effectuate [the adoption
statutes'] beneficial purposes").
54. Id.

55. See id. at 857 (delineating the steps that must be taken in order for best interests
of the child to be truly realized: "(1) transferring to the adoptive parent all legal rights,
duties, and consequences of the parental relationship, (2) severing the rights and
obligations of any natural parent who no longer will have custody of the child, and (3)
determining all other legal effects of the adoption upon the families of the natural
parents and the adoptive parents").
56. See id. at 858-59 (listing as a benefit the protection of Hillary in the event of
Bruce's death, since Mark would be entitled to be Hillary's guardian).
57. Id. at 859.
58. See id. at 851 (holding that statutory language might be fairly understood to
comprehend various scenarios, though only some are expressly mentioned by way of
example).
59. Id. at 853.
60. 684 N.Y.S.2d 760, 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
61. Id. at 761.
62. Id.
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petition because the Court of Appeals had granted another unmarried
couple's second parent adoption petition.6 3 Thus, there was "no valid
reason not to extend that right to foster parents, albeit unmarried." 64
In In re Adoption of Carl, an unmarried man and woman who were
living together filed a joint petition to adopt a child who was not related to
them. 65 At an adoption agency's request, the couple had served as the
child's foster parents for four years. 66 Although they chose not to marry,
the couple had been life partners for twenty-four years.67 The issue before
the court was "whether the petitioners, two unmarried adults, may jointly
68
adopt a child who is the child of neither of them.,
First, the court looked at whether the statute allowed such an adoption.
It concluded that section 1 10 of the New York adoption statute expressly
permitted "[a]n adult unmarried person or an adult husband and his wife
together... [or] [a]n adult married person who is living separate and apart
from his or her spouse ...[in accordance with a legal separation order] or
has been living separate[ly] and apart from his or her spouse for at least
three years" to adopt a child. 69 The statute clearly permitted married
persons, unmarried adults, stepparents, and separated persons to adopt
children in New York. 70 The court cited other precedent that had held that
the word "together" in the statute did not mean that only married couples
could jointly adopt a child. 71 Accordingly, it held that Section 110 did not
expressly prohibit unmarried joint adoptions.7 2 The court reasoned that two
unmarried petitioners who were willing and able to parent Carl and provide
him with a permanent and stable home should be able to adopt him. The
single woman's male partner was functioning as the child's legal parent.73
The adoption was in Carl's best interests. The court further reasoned that
"[t]o deny the adoption would.., create a family with two unmarried
parents only one of whom would be allowed to formalize his or her

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
would

See id. (citing the "best interests" of the child as justification for its ruling).
See id. (citing In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 414 (N.Y. 1995)).
709 N.Y.S.2d 905, 906 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 907.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 110 (McKinney 2009).
See In re Adoption of Carl,709 N.Y.S.2d at 908-09.
See id.at 909 (applying the word "together" only to married persons, which
not preclude unmarried persons from adopting).

72. Id.

73. Accord In re Adoption of M.A., 930 A.2d 1088, 1097 (Me. 2007) (affording
the strong parental structure present similar weight in determining that adoption served
the children's best interests); In re Adoption of Joseph, 684 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1998).
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parental relationship with Carl. Such a result would be contrary to . . .
provid[ing] the child with emotional stability and permanency. 7 4
In the same year that Carl was decided, two more unmarried petitioners
filed an application to adopt a boy named Emilio. In In re Adoption of
Emilio R., Emilio's maternal great-aunt and her unmarried heterosexual
partner had lived together for twenty years.75 They wanted to adopt Emilio
after the death of his grandmother, who had cared for Emilio after a court
terminated his birth mother's parental rights upon finding that she was
incapable of caring for him. 76 When they filed the petition, they had raised
Emilio with their biological son and treated Emilio as if he were their son
since he was sixteen months old.77 Furthermore, the boys considered
brothers and Emilio viewed his aunt's partner as the "father he
themselves 78
had.",
never
The Family Court denied the petition based on concerns that often are
expressed about unmarried persons who file petitions to adopt childrenthe adoption "would not promote the child's sense of permanency or
emotional stability .... ,, On the contrary, the appellate court ruled that
the statute did not prohibit adoption by an unmarried couple when neither
of the adults was the child's biological parent. 80 The court reasoned that
there was a blood relationship between one of the prospective parents and
that the couple had provided a "nurturing family setting." 81 "If the goal is
indeed to encourage a familial permanency through adoption, it is difficult
to imagine a more suitable set of eligible parents than petitioners," stated
the court, noting that there was no basis in law or fact for the Family Court
to have so grossly ignored the best interests of Emilio 82in light of
petitioners' "good faith and exemplary parental performance.,
In 2004, following the Carl opinion, another New York court also
decided that the state adoption statute did not present an impediment to an
unmarried couple's joint adoption of a child.83 The court reasoned that the
74. In reAdoption of Carl,709 N.Y.S.2d at 910 (citations omitted).
75. 742 N.Y.S.2d 22, 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).

76. See id. (noting that Emilio had been under the custody of the petitioners for
more than thirteen years).
77. Id.

78. Id.
79. See id. (finding error in the Family Court's holding that the petitioners' lacked
standing due their common law marriage, and that the non-inclusion of such status in
the adoption statute was a disqualifying factor).
80. Id. at 30.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See In re Adoption of Carolyn B., 774 N.Y.S.2d 227, 229-30 (N.Y. App. Div.
2004) (finding that under a joint adoption scheme, the two petitioners could avoid

having to obtain costly separate adoptions that would leave the child with only a single
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two women who had engaged in a commitment ceremony had been
"functioning jointly" as the child's parents and were seeking to create a
legal relationship that permanently reflected the reality of their family
situation.84
More recently, courts in Indiana and Maine have addressed this issue. In
2006, in R.K.H. v. Morgan County Office of Family and Children (In re
Infant Girl W.), the issue presented to the Court of Appeals of Indiana was
"whether the Indiana Adoption Act permits an unmarried couple-any
unmarried couple, regardless of gender or sexual orientation-to file a joint
petition for adoption." 85 The child had been placed with licensed foster
parents who had been living together in a committed relationship for more
than eleven years.86
First, the court of appeals ruled that "statutory construction is a matter of
law reserved for the court[,]" but when a statute is unambiguous, no
interpretation can be made.87 The court is obligated to "apply its plain and
clear meaning. 88 The Indiana adoption statute provides that an Indiana
resident may file a petition to adopt a child, and that married persons must
adopt jointly. 89 The statute is silent, however, as to whether single persons
may adopt jointly. 90 The court ruled that "[ilt is a well-settled rule of
statutory construction that words used in their singular also include their
plural." 91 Thus the term "resident" in the statute could be read to include
"residents., 92 Therefore, "under the Indiana Adoption Act, an unmarried
couple may file a joint petition to adopt a minor child., 93 Furthermore, the
court held that its decision was consistent with a 2003 decision allowing
94
second parent adoption based on the benefits of a two-parent household.
In In re Adoption of MA., a 2007 case, a same-sex couple filed a joint
petition to adopt two foster children who had been living in their home for

parent while the second adoption was being finalized).
84. Id. at 230.
85. 845 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Ind.Ct. App. 2006).
86. See id. (pointing out that the petitioners were licensed foster parents who had
cared for the child since she was two days old).
87. Id. at 242.
88. Id.

89. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-2-2(a) (West 2009).
90. See § 31-19-2-4 (including consent requirements that only applied to married

persons).

91. R.K.H., 845 N.E.2d at 242.
92. Id.

93. Id. at 243.
94. See id. at 242 n.7 (citing In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003)) (upholding a woman's petition to jointly adopt her same-sex
partner's three adopted children).
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two years. 95 Both children were special needs children suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder, reactive attachment disorder, and attention deficit
and hyperactive disorder. 96 The prospective adoptive parents were not
related to the children. The children's guardian ad litem, the Department of
Health and Human Services' adoption worker, and its adoption supervisor
filed recommendations in support of the petition.97 Still, the Probate Court
denied the petition because it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under the
adoption statute to consider the application.98 The court strictly construed
section 9-301 of the Maine statute which provided that a "husband and wife
jointly or an unmarried person, resident or nonresident of the State, may
petition the Probate Court to adopt a person, regardless of age, and to
change that person's name." 99
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine considered the question of
"whether a joint petition for adoption filed by two unmarried persons is
procedurally barred because the statute addresses joint petitions only in
connection with a husband and wife, but not in connection with two
unmarried persons."' 100 Like the Indiana court, the Maine court concluded
that the Maine adoption statute was silent with respect to joint adoptions by
unmarried applicants. 10' Examining the plain meaning of the statute, the
court decided that the statute was ambiguous and it did not include an
express restriction that would disqualify joint petitions by unmarried
persons.10 2 "[I]f we infer that section 9-301 prohibits joint petitions by
unmarried persons, but does not prohibit joint adoption by two unmarried
persons, unmarried persons can still accomplish a joint adoption through
successive or consolidated individual petitions," explained the court, noting
that construing the statute to prohibit joint petitions by unmarried persons
would "elevate[] form over substance to an illogical degree."' 1 3 Finally,
the court determined that Maine's adoption statute should be liberally

95. 930 A.2d 1088, 1090 (Me. 2007).
96. Id.

97. See id. (indicating that the guardian ad litem and Department adoption workers
felt adoption was in the children's best interests).
98. Id. at 1091.
99. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.tit. 18A, § 9-301 (2008).
100. In reAdoption of MA., 930 A.2d at 1091.

101. See id.at 1092-93 (rejecting the petitioner's assertion that a statutory rule of
construction of section 9-301 would cause the term "unmarried person" in the statute to
include the plural "unmarried persons").
102. See id. at 1093 (refusing to narrowly construe the statute in the absence of a
limiting adverb such as "solely").
103. See id.(specifying that the couple could file separate individual petitions for
adoption and move to consolidate the petitions for a single proceeding or one of them
could file a petition and when that petition is granted, the other parent could file a
second adoption petition).

672

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 17:3

construed to promote the state's underlying policy---"to protect the rights
and privileges of the child being adopted."' 4 Thus, section 9-301 0did
not
5
prohibit two unmarried persons from filing a joint adoption petition.
B. The Strict Interpretation- Denying Joint Petitions
Several courts have applied strict construction when answering the
question of whether two unmarried persons may adopt jointly. 10 6 They
have held that because an adoption statute does not expressly provide for
certain types of adoption, those petitions cannot be granted. 10 7 Changing
the statute is a legislative matter, not a matter of interpretation for the
courts.
In In re Jason C., a man and a woman were foster parents for a child for
two years before the man and woman divorced. 10 8 After the divorce, the
man continued to spend time with the child and to support the child
financially. The woman, now a divorcee, filed a petition to adopt the child.
Afterward, the man filed a separate petition to join in the adoption.0 9 The
trial court denied the petition because the New Hampshire adoption statute
did not authorize it to issue a joint adoption decree for two unmarried
adults.' 1° On appeal, the man argued that since the statute allowed "an
unmarried adult" to adopt, the term "adult" should be construed to mean
"adults.""' He further argued that courts should interpret adoption statutes
"to facilitate the adoption of children by removing 'arbitrary and broad
restrictions' on who could adopt and to enable the courts to respond to the
varied circumstances of individual cases."'1 12 The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire affirmed the trial court's decision.' 13 It ruled that construing the
state's adoption statute to allow the probate court to entertain the adoption
petition from two unmarried adults would be contrary to legislative
intent. 114 To reach this conclusion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
examined the language of the statute regarding categories of petitioners
eligible to adopt. The statute stated that "an 'unmarried adult,' and the
104. Id. at 1096.

105. Id. at 1098.
106. See, e.g., In re Jason C., 533 A.2d 32 (N.H. 1987).
107. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2007).
108. 533 A.2d at 32.
109. See id. at 33 (explaining that the foster mother would oppose the foster father's
petition if he sought to obtain standing to request physical custody in the future).
110. See id. (construing the language of the statute literally).
11.

Id.

112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 34.
114. Id. at 33.
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'unmarried father or mother of the individual to be adopted,"' may petition,
and that "[m]arried applicants must apply jointly with their spouses,
however, except under narrowly limited circumstances." 1' 15
The court stated a preference for married couples who were living
together. "We may infer, then, that it was the legislature's intent to confine
adoption to applicants who will probably provide a unified and stable
household for the child. This objective is not likely
to be served by
' 16
authorizing two unmarried applicants to adopt jointly." "
In August 2007, a New York court refused to interpret the same adoption
statute that it had liberally construed in In re Adoption of Carl, In re

Adoption of Joseph, and other cases, to allow joint petitioners who were not
intimately involved to adopt a child. 1 7 In re Adoption of Garrett was8
decided almost twenty years after In re Jason C. in New Hampshire."
After the child's parents divorced, the child lived with his biological
mother and her biological brother, the child's uncle, in New York.1 9 After
living together for approximately eight months, the sister and brother filed
a joint petition to adopt the sister's child. The child's biological father
consented to the adoption. 20 The court acknowledged that "adoption law
had undergone a significant transformation" because same-sex couples and
unmarried heterosexual
couples had been allowed to adopt children in the
121
State of New York.
The court reiterated that the purposes of adoption were "providing the
best possible home for the child or giving legal recognition to an existing
family unit."' 122 However, the court declined to expand current adoption
principles "to virtually unlimited boundaries" to allow a biological parent
and another member of her family to adopt the parent's child. 123 It refused
to expand prior holdings that allowed same-sex and unmarried heterosexual
couples to adopt because of what it described as a notable distinction
124
between a sister and brother petition and its holdings in earlier decisions.
115. Id.

116. See id. at 33-34 (expressing concern about the difficulty in deciding where the

child would live since the couple had previously divorced).
117. In re Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
118. Id.; In reJasonC.,53 A.2d at 32.
119. In re Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing In re Adoption of Carl, 709 N.Y.S.2d 905 (2000) and In re Jacob,
660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995)).
122. Id. at 733.
123. Id; See Decisions of Interest, Man Can't Adopt Sister's Child While She
Remains Legal Parent, 9 N.Y. FAM. L. MONTHLY 7 (Oct. 2007) (noting the lack of
precedent for this decision and the court's unwillingness to stretch the existing
adoption case law).
124. See In re Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 732-33 (concluding that the
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The court held that all of the previous cases involved situations in which
"the relationship between the proposed adoptive parents is the functional
equivalent of the traditional husband-wife relationship.' 2 5 Moreover, the
court ruled, it would not allow this additional type of adoption without
direction from a "higher court," indicating that the interested parties
should
26
seek declaratory relief elsewhere in the New York court system. 1

VI. ANALYSIS: EXPANDING THE NOTION OF FAMILY FOR PARENTLESS
CHILDREN

Already, family members across the county are either living together, or
in close geographic proximity to each other, and are successfully parenting
children. In fact, some have done so longer than some married couples that
have raised children in an intact marriage. More states should interpret
adoption statutes to allow these adults to adopt without the current
strictures imposed on unmarried persons who want to adopt a child.
A. An Additional Model ofFamilyforAll Waiting Children
27
The American Bar Association supports the concept of joint adoption.1
It announced its support for "state and territorial laws and court decisions
that permit the establishment of legal parent-child relationships through
joint adoptions and adoptions by unmarried persons who are functioning as
a child's parents when such adoptions are in the best interests of the
child." 128 For these purposes, joint adoption would be defined as when two
or more unmarried adults, who may or may not be related to a child, adopt
a child together. No involvement in a romantic/sexual relationship or
cohabitation would be required.
Professor Angela Mae Kupenda advocates that two single adults who are
not romantically involved or in a "traditional marriage relationship" should
be permitted to adopt a child jointly. 129 In 1997, Professor Kupenda

brother-sister relationship does not implicate the same rationale, mimicking the "ideal"
family, as previous cases had).
125. Id. at 732.
126. Id. at 733.
127. ABA Center of Children and the Law, Joint and Second Parent Adoptions

(Aug. 2003), http://www.abanet.org/child/foster-adopt.shtml (last visited on June 5,
2009).
128. Id.

129. Angela Mae Kupenda, Two Parents Are Better than None: Whether Two
Single, African American Adults-Who Are Not in a Traditional Marriage or a
Romantic or Sexual Relationship with Each Other-Should Be Allowed to Jointly
Adopt and Co-ParentAfrican American Children, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 703,
703 (1997).
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proposed this additional model for adopting African American children.130
Any two single adults who share a "close committed bond" who qualified
individually could adopt a child together.'13 The proposal was based on the
extended family model of raising children that always has existed in the
African American family. That is, traditionally, many people other than a
child's biological parents, including extended family132 members and
unrelated people, help to raise African American children.
Professor Kupenda contends that informal adoption and the extended
family concept are African traditions that Africans continued when they
were enslaved and brought to the United States. 1 33 In Africa, multiple
adults raised children. "Parenting was shared by the extended family and
friends, with multiple adults filling the parental role."'' 34 The practice
continued when African parents were permanently separated from their
child and
other adults took over the role of parent for the parentless
35
child.
Professor Kupenda posits that "two single, black co-parents are certainly
better than no parents"' 36 -the only alternative that will exist for too many
children who are available for adoption. Professor Kupenda supported her
theory with four points: 1) there is a stigma associated with single
parenting, especially for African American women and men; 2) a single
person may not have the financial resources for making a long-term
commitment to care for a child, and pooling resources will enable single
adoptive parents to "provide greater stability and security [for a child];" 3)
many African Americans already are caring for children whom they have
informally adopted; and 4) thousands of African American children
will
37
not be adopted because of racism and cultural misunderstandings.1
Professor Kupenda's novel approach to adoption should be expanded to
apply to all children who are available for adoption, not just African
130. See id (advancing that under this model, "two friends, two sisters, two

brothers, a sister and a brother [and so on] could jointly adopt and co-parent a child").
131. Id. at 705.
132. See id. at 705, 707 (emphasizing that this model was not intended to replace the
present system but could work for African Americans as it reflected the reality of
raising children in the black community). See generally Gilbert A. Holmes, The

Extended Family System in the Black Community: A Child-Centered Model for
Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1649, 1658 (1995) (noting that there is a long

history of extended family members helping to raise African American children).
133. Kupenda, supra note 129, at 711-12.
134. Id. at 712.
135. Id.; see Holmes, supra note 132, at 1660-65 (describing the history and
sociology of the experiences of the black extended family unit).
136. Kupenda, supra note 129, at 706.
137. See id at 708-10 (noting that scholars suggest that the continued reliance on the
traditional model is racist and oppressive, reflecting a preference for the white,
heterosexual traditional family structure).
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American children. African American children are the second largest
group of children who are available for adoption, but a significant number
of White and Latino children 1 who
are available for adoption could also
38
benefit from Kupenda's model.
In adoption, the child's best interests are of paramount concern, so an
advocate for joint parenting must begin with the benefits of joint adoption
from a child's perspective. The child will have two legal parents, which
means that the child would have certain rights and may be eligible for
certain economic and non-economic benefits that the child would not be
entitled to absent an adoption. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
summarized the benefits of allowing two unmarried persons to adopt a
child in a single petition:
A joint adoption assures that in the event of either adoptive parent's
death, the children's continued relationship with the surviving adoptive
parent is fixed and certain. A joint adoption also enables the children to
be eligible for a variety of public and private benefits, including Social
Security, worker's compensation, and intestate succession, as well as
employment benefits such as health insurance and family leave, on
account of not one, but two legally recognized parents. Most
importantly, a joint adoption affords the adopted
39 children the love,
nurturing, and support of not one, but two parents.
Allowing adults who already care for children and those who want to
care for a child to jointly adopt a child also means that the adoptive parents
will have certain rights and responsibilities. As adoptive parents they
would receive all of the rights and responsibilities of parenting a child as if
the child were their biological child. Thus, they will be recognized as the
child's legal parents and have the same rights and obligations as a
biological parent.1 40 They will have joint decision-making authority to
determine where the child will be educated, the child's religious
upbringing, and decisions about the child's medical care. They will have
authority to claim the child dependency exemption and other tax benefits.
They will have standing to sue for custody or access to the child if one of
the parents dies or there is a breakdown in the relationship. Their consent
will be required before the child could be adopted by anyone else.14 '
In addition, the new parents will have obligations to the child. As any
other parents would, they will be obligated to cover the child under their
insurance policy. They will have an obligation to meet the child's basic
138. ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE, supra note 15, at 2.
139. In re Adoption of M.A., 930 A.2d 1088, 1097 (Me. 2007).
140. See Carter v. Carter, 546 S.E.2d 220, 221 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that
the stepparent becomes a joint guardian of the child who is jointly responsible for
decision-making and for support).
141. MABRY& KELLY, supra note 12, at 578-80.
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42
needs for food, shelter, and clothing.1
Two parents are better than one. Certainly there are many single women
and men who successfully have raised their children. According to the
most recent Census Report, millions of children are living with one
parent. 143 More than two million children live with two unmarried
parents. 144 The benefit for children in foster care of allowing joint-adoption
is that they will have two adults to care for them, so if one parent becomes
incapacitated or dies, someone else will be there to provide the care and
support that the child needs. Agencies that have been reluctant to certify
single women should expand the pool of prospective adoptive parents by
recruiting more qualified single persons to adopt and allowing single
persons to adopt a child together. "Having
two legal parents forever will
'' 45
interests."
best
children's
the
in
be
clearly
As Professor Kupenda noted, the joint parenting model already exists
outside the courts. 146 Many single parents already rely upon others to help
them to raise their children. In certain cultures, such as the African
American, Latino, and Indian cultures, adults customarily take children into
their home and informally adopt them as their own. 47 Sometimes the care
that is provided is temporary, other times the adults care for the child
together until he or she reaches the age of majority. Some of these adult
caregivers would adopt the child if they were allowed to do so.
Widespread endorsement of joint adoption plans across the United States
will protect children and the adults who care for them. It also will ensure
that valid adoption orders entered in one state will be recognized in another
state if the family decides to relocate or to spend a significant period of
time in another state. 48 Joint adoption should be more widely recognized

142. See id. (explaining that generally, the joint adoptive parents will have equal

responsibilities for the care, nurture, welfare, education, and support for the adopted
child).
143. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 50 Million
Children Lived with Married Parents in 2007 (July 28, 2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/marital-status-living_
arrangements/0 12437.html.
144. Id.
145. See In re Adoption of M.A., 930 A.2d 1088, 1090 (Me. 2007) (quoting the
guardian ad litem's recommendation for a second parent adoption in Maine) (internal
citations omitted).
146. See Kupenda, supra note 129, at 712 (stating that support from others, those
outside of the nuclear family, is considered critical and is respected in African
American families).
147. Angela Mae Kupenda et al., Aren't Two Parents Better Than None:
Contractualand Statutory Basics for a "'New" African American Co-ParentingJoint
Adoption Model, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 59, 59-61 (1999) [hereinafter
Kupenda et al., Aren't Two Parents].

148. See Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860, 862 (E.D. La. 2008) (finding
violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which guarantees that any state's valid
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because it will mean that more children will be placed in permanent homes
with qualified adults who can and are willing to care for them. The
possibility of joint adoption would provide a "greater incentive for other
unmarried persons to undertake the profound and difficult responsibility of
serving as pre-adoptive foster parents for young children with significant
special needs," because 1 absent
such an incentive "there will be fewer
49
homes for such children."
B. AdditionalBest Interests Criteriafor JointAdoptions

All states have promulgated statutes which enumerate criteria for
ascertaining whether an adoption would be in a child's best interests.150 To
ascertain whether two or more unmarried adults who are not romantically
linked may adopt a child together, further inquiry must be made to
ascertain whether the applicants would provide a safe, secure and suitable
home for a particular child.
In addition to the typical best interest analysis, other criteria should be
examined when joint petitions are filed. The additional criteria should
include, but not be limited to, a home assessment that addresses the
following concerns:
* The petitioners' demonstrated commitment to shared parenting;
" The love, affection, and emotional bond between the child and
the adults who want to adopt the child;
* Whether each petitioner is or will function as a parent;
" Whether the petitioners and the child are a part of an established
family unit;
* The extent and length of shared parenting before the petition was
filed;
* The petitioners' ability/capacity to make decisions together;
* The petitioners' parenting styles;
* The child's preference;
* The petitioners' relationship to each other and the likelihood that
a cooperative relationship will continue; and,
" The petitioners' living arrangement.
A Delaware court considered the following criteria to ascertain whether
a person was functioning as a child's parent. Under its definition, an adult
should be considered the child's parent when he or she:
Has assumed the obligations of parenthood by taking significant
adoption decree must be honored by every other state).
149. In re Adoption of MA., 930 A.2d at 1098.
150. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (2009) (instructing courts to consider
relevant factors, including the wishes of the child and his or her parents).
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responsibility for the child's care, education and developmentincluding the child's support, without the expectation of financial
compensation.
Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have
established a bonded and dependent relationship that is parental in
nature.
Has helped to shape the child's daily routine by addressing
developmental needs, disciplining the child, providing for the child's
education and medical care and serving as a moral guide.
Has on a day to day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay,
and mutuality, fulfilled the child's needs for a psychological adult who
helped fulfill the child's needs to be loved, valued, appreciated
and
1 51
received, as an essential person by the adult who cares for him.

1. No Requirementfor Marriage
A marriage license, while an acceptable ground for consideration, should
not be a requirement when two willing and suitable adults want to provide
a permanent home for a child. Many couples who seek to adopt children
jointly have been living together longer than some couples have been
married. One author calls favoring married couples in the adoption process
"legal racism.', 152 Stability for a child cannot be determined on the basis of
marital status. There are unmarried couples, family members, and friends
who have been committed to each other for decades. Many join together to
parent children informally. "Marriage should matter less" as courts
determine whether two adults should be allowed to adopt a child.153
Marital status does not guarantee a forever family. The current divorce
rate among heterosexuals is forty-three percent. 154 Moreover, some
married persons who have adopted one or more children have divorced
after adopting
the children, so marriage does not guarantee stability for
155
adoptees.
151. In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179, 1187-88 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001).
152. See Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of UnmarriedPeople in

American Law, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 207, 237 (1988) (claiming that the legal bias against
non-traditional family arrangements amounts to racism because racial and ethnic
minorities often choose such arrangements).

153. Nancy Polikoff, Professor, Washington College of Law, Presentation at the
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law Symposium: Valuing
All
Families
Under
Law
(Jan.
26,
2009),
available
at
http://media.wcl.american.edu/Mediasite/Viewer/?peid=27332bf5-ebc8-49a4-baa8939be5a006f3.
154.

CDC

NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, FIRST MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION,

DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE: UNITED STATES 17 (2001), http://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/data/ad/ad323.pdf.
155. Compare Celebrity Adoptions: Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman,
http://www.virginmedia.com/homefamily/relationships/celebrity-adoptions.php?ssid=4
(last visited June 5, 2009) (detailing the couple's adoption of two children), with Daniel
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2. No Requirementfor a Romantic or Marriage-likeRelationship
Similarly, a romantic relationship should not be required for joint
adoption. Some prospective adoptive parents will not be involved in a
sexual or romantic relationship with the person with whom they want to
adopt a child, The applicants could be relatives or good friends. Many
friendships outlast marital relationships.
3. No UnreasonableLimits on the Number of Petitioners Who May Join in
a Petition
Some courts have held that to allow unmarried persons to file joint
petitions will result in an indefinite number of persons who could join in a
single petition to adopt a child.156 Allowing an unlimited number of
persons to join to adopt a child may be catastrophic for the willing
prospective adoptive parents as well as the child. Also, because it has been
a decade-long struggle to get legislatures and courts to recognize two adults
who want to parent a child together, perhaps it would be more plausible to
suggest that the number of petitioners be limited to two adults in most
instances.
On the other hand, an exception may be warranted in some cases. For
example, two sisters who live with their brother may petition to adopt their
ten-year-old nephew. All three adults are devoted to raising the child and
this way the child will have female and male role models while feeling the
love of all three adults. The child will be able to inherit from all of them
and to receive additional benefits such as medical benefits from one or
more of them. An alternative would be foster care where he would have
multiple placements and there is a high probability that he would age out of
the system without being adopted. Indeed, under this joint adoption model,
a child really could have two mothers, two dads, two mothers and a dad, or
any number of different configurations.
4. No Necessityfor a ContractualAgreement

Professor Angela Mae Kupenda who originally called for joint adoptions
between adults who parent African American children in the extended

Jeffreys, The Wife Who Tired of Cruise Control, DAILY

MAIL (London), Feb. 7, 2001,
at 8, available at
http://www.rickross.com/reference/scientology/scien278.htmi
(reporting the couple's divorce three years after adoption).
156. See, e.g., In re Adoption of M.A., 930 A.2d 1088, 1092 (Me. 2007). But see
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthoodto
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other NontraditionalFamilies, 78

GEO. L.J. 459, 524 (1990) [hereinafter Polikoff, This Child] (noting how courts have
recognized that adoption statutes are unable to protect children from family structures
changing away from the traditional model).
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family tradition 157 later joined with other professors to recommend that

unmarried joint petitioners enter into a contractual arrangement "to better
assure a similar commitment between the coparents ... and aid [them] in

thinking through and planning for their own unique needs and sharing
parenting roles and dynamics., 158 The proposed contractual terms would
include "mutual assent," and a "mutual exchange of promises."15 9
The contractual requirement that Professor Kupenda and her colleagues
propose should not be a requirement for joint petitioners. The adoption
process is already complex and very convoluted. Requiring a contract will
cause further delay and increase expenses because employment of attorneys
and others may be necessary to ensure that the contractual provisions are
enforceable. 160
Whatever process states adopt to evaluate adoption
petitions and the petitioners, it should be designed to ensure that children
will be placed in permanent homes that meet their needs as early as
possible. Requiring the parties to enter into a contract does not further that
goal.
VII. CONCLUSION
More than a decade has passed since a New Jersey Court noted that the
non-traditional type of family unit was becoming an increasing
phenomenon.' 61 As other courts have observed, current definitions of
family were formulated in the early 1900s. At that time, the legislature
could not have contemplated that same-sex adults would file petitions to
adopt children. 62 Certainly, during those times, many different
configurations of family were not contemplated either. Accordingly, just
as courts decided to expand the definition of family to permit unmarried
couples to adopt, so should they expand the list to include other types of
families. To fail to acknowledge these families would create an absurd and
157. See Kupenda, supra note 129, at 711-12 (describing how the African American
tradition makes co-parenting structures particularly suitable for African American
children).
158. Kupenda et al., Aren't Two Parents,supra note 147, at 71-72.
159. Id. at 72-73.

160. See In re Adoption of MA., 930 A.2d at 1097 (noting that the ability to file joint
petitions of adoption saves parties the burden of proceeding through separate petitions
with the added cost and delay that arise from a more complex process).
161. See In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 540-41 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (holding that the relationship served the best interests of the
child and thus deserved legal protection, despite the public's disapproval of the
family's non-traditional structure ).
162. In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 857 (D.C. 1995); Adoption of Tammy,
619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoptions of B.L.V.D. and E.L.V.B., 628
A.2d 1271, 1274 (Vt. 1993); see Polikoff, This Child, supra note 156, at 524
(recognizing that legislatures likely did not consider non-traditional adoptions when the
adoption laws were drafted).
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unreasonable result.1
Nineteen years ago, in In re MM.D.& B.H.M, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals explicitly noted that it was not deciding whether three
siblings who were living together or two persons who were not living
together could adopt a child.' 64 It is time for courts to reinterpret adoption
statutes so that existing families like these may be formalized and that more
families can be created for children who need them. The current
distinctions like the one made by the court in In re Garrett are absurd.
Recent opinions like those in In re Infant Girl W. in Indiana and Adoption
of MA. in Maine support the joint adoption concept while the court in In re
Garretttook a giant step away from embracing such adoptions in the State
of New York when it denied the sister/brother petition.
Other courts have been concerned that the legislature has not expressly
permitted joint adoptions and have been reluctant to grant those petitions
absent a proper legislative amendment. 165 For that reason, state legislators
must be urged to promulgate legislation and agencies must implement
procedures to create more families for children. Meanwhile, because the
process of amending legislation takes months, more courts should apply a
liberal construction to adoption statutes so that qualified adults may adopt
children even if they are not married and even if they do not live together in
a romantic relationship. The strict statutory construction that ignores the
configuration of the current family structure robs children of two parents.
Alternatives to joint parenting certainly would include second parent
adoption (when it is permitted in a particular state), guardianship,
establishment of a power of attorney, a will that provides for the child upon
the caretaker's death, and a shared parenting agreement. 166 However, none
of those options is satisfactory for a child in foster care or the persons who
are caring for the child.
Furthermore, these alternatives are not in the child's best interests
because the child will not have two adults who are his or her legal parents.
Courts have opined that when joint petitions are not allowed, it causes the
163. See generally Jason N.W. Plowman, Note, When Second-ParentAdoption is
the Second-Best Option: The Case for Legislative Reform as the Next Best Optionfor
Same-Sex Couples in the Face of Continued MarriageInequality, 1 SCHOLAR 57, 5859 (2008) (arguing that failing to recognize some family relationships denies children
support and the legal protection of both their parents).
164. See 662 A.2d at 846 n.5 (noting that a case involving adoption by multiple
siblings could raise issues that are distinct from those in a case involving two people
who are living together in a committed relationship).
165. See S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 835 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (describing
the judiciary's role as limited to answering whether state law permits certain adoptions,
not constructing adoption rights for policy reasons).
166. See In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 2152A, 2153A, 2154A, 641 A.2d 889,
893 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (examining multiple situations which terminated the
natural parents' rights).

2009]

JOINT AND SHARED PARENTING

person who cannot adopt the child to file a second-parent or "stepparenttype" petition "which would amount to little more than a legal fiction with
the result being' 167the same-both petition[er]s would be [the child's]
adoptive parent."
As one attorney argued on behalf of two unmarried petitioners, "[t]his is
[2009], and these are real issues where the legislation hasn't caught up with
many, many people who are in the shadows of what our Christian nation
views as family."' 168 A few courts have left it to their state legislatures to
decide whether other types of non-traditional families should be
recognized. 169 When the Kentucky Court of Appeals refused to recognize a
second-parent adoption because the statute did not expressly provide for
such adoptions, it reasoned that "[n]othing can be assumed, presumed, or
inferred and what is not found in the statute is a matter for the legislature to
supply and not the courts."' 170 The court suggested that the parties' lawyers
"would have been perfectly justified in petitioning the Legislature, or
encouraging their clients to do so, for an amendment to the adoption
laws." 7' Because adoption laws vary in each state and who may adopt is
governed by adoption statutes, citizens, attorneys, and other adoption
advocates must lobby their state legislators to change the laws so that they
accurately reflect how families look today.
In sum, the interpretation of statutes to expand the definition of family
must be broadened so that more families can be created for children. The
scope of shared parenting must be expanded to include prospective
adoptive families other than heterosexual or same-sex couples who are
living together. Finally, agencies and those who are in the position to
accept adoption petitions and to evaluate prospective adoptive parents must
expand their appreciation for a variety of family types. Many more single
women, for example, one group that already adopts thousands of children,
probably would adopt more children if agencies and other decision makers
for whom th[e] [dualwere more receptive. "[T]here are many children
' 72
gender married couple] 'ideal' is not possible."'

167. In re Adoption of Carl, 709 N.Y.S.2d 905, 910 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000).
168. S.J.L.S., 265 S.W.3d at 817 (emphasis omitted).
169. See id. at 835 (placing the moral duty on the legislature to determine whether
different marriages and rights are socially recognized and protected).
170. Id.at 819 (quoting Day v. Day, 937 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ky. 1997)).
171. Id. at 835.
172. See PROWLER, supra note 34, at 4.

